Two years and two days after reshaping the geopolitics of the Middle East, the Gaza war could come to an end with the first phase of the ceasefire agreement accepted by Israel and Hamas on October 9. While the content of the agreement may be contested, it offers a potential path toward regional stability after two years of chaos. However, it remains unclear to what extent the agreement will be respected by all parties, particularly Israel, which has violated several ceasefires in the past, while Hamas faces the challenge of demilitarization.
Despite the fact that several Western states supported the two-state solution by recognizing the Palestinian state, symbolically at the United Nations General Assembly last September, this path is clearly disapproved of by the Israeli Prime Minister and his extremist administration. In that sense, the French-Saudi initiative, launched at the United Nations between July and September, was perceived as a challenge to U.S. hegemony over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since then, while the project faced major obstacles to its implementation on the ground, it became a significant catalyst for diplomacy, as Trump sought to impose a framework for the crisis’s outcome in coordination with Netanyahu.[1]
It should be noted that the primary concern of the U.S. President was not to harm the Abraham Accords — Trump’s major achievement during his first term — which could have been definitively damaged by the stalemate in the Gaza war and by Israel’s reshaping actions in the region. In doing so, the peace agreement concluded under certain conditions, with a tight schedule due to the commemoration of the two-year anniversary of the attacks of 7 October 2023, but above all due to the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony, accelerated the process, which, under the guise of a ceasefire agreement, seems more like the beginning of a new phase, worthy of an amicable settlement between Trump and Netanyahu. Still, significant grey areas persist regarding the representativeness of the future local governance, while the absence of justice seems to dictate the outcome of the crisis. Since Trump did not receive the Nobel Peace Prize on October 10, his diplomatic narrative lost part of its symbolic strength. Although personal ambition might have played a role in his involvement, the broader political logic behind the ceasefire deal remains primarily strategic, aimed at consolidating his regional influence and supporting Netanyahu’s position to serve shared economic interests.
Washington’s proposed plan to end the crisis in Gaza had already sparked fears over its intention to displace local populations. The current project, though a revised version of the earlier « Riviera » plan, remains deeply asymmetrical — a settlement largely favouring Israel, which continues to object to any genuine form of local self-determination for Palestinians. Entrusting the area’s administration to an international consortium only underscores the limits of a peace promoted by Western actors, reflecting a lingering neocolonial ambition. Therefore, before it can pave the way for peace at the regional level, this proposal should be seen primarily as an opportunity to end the turmoil that has beset the entire region — a pause in destabilization whose durability will depend on Israel and Hamas.[2] Both actors could in fact strategically benefit from the continuation of the war in Gaza. The disarmament of Hamas constitutes a major issue, as the group wishes to continue resisting Israel. In that case, it would be difficult to imagine Gaza’s reconstruction, especially for the Gulf states, since any renewed attacks by Hamas on Israel could destroy what has been rebuilt.[3] The main dilemma for peace is that Hamas wishes to continue playing a role in the Palestinians’ future, while Israel is unwilling to fully withdraw from Gaza — a move that could potentially reunite the two Palestinian territories.
Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President during the Biden administration, Philip Gordon, considers Trump’s desire to claim the Nobel Peace Prize as carrying a particularly high stake, given the intention to frame this peace plan in Netanyahu’s interests — enabling Netanyahu to claim a political and military victory, while also potentially reigniting hostilities once the hostages are released.[4] Indeed, from a political survival perspective, this strategy of reviving the war could help Netanyahu remain in power, while reopening the Iranian front in this configuration would again divert international attention away from Gaza.[5] Sustained pressure from Washington and Middle Eastern States to restrain Netanyahu’s bellicose ambitions could help prevent the breaking of the October 9 agreement with Hamas.[6] Nonetheless, uncertainty persists as to whether this pressure on Israel will be sufficient to contain its reshaping ambitions, particularly with regard to Iran, given its previous offensive actions and ongoing rhetoric against the Islamic regime. Two paths remain open to the Israeli government : to capitalize on this agreement by advancing new normalization deals, or to continue its military-led approach toward the Middle East, which would further isolate Israel.[7] In the event of a stalemate in the Gaza war and the opening of a new stage of confrontation with Iran, Israeli-Arab normalization would once again be pushed into uncertain territory. Last September, following Israel’s attack against Qatar, Egypt proposed the creation of a NATO-style military force to contain Israel’s destabilizing actions in the region, during the extraordinary Arab–Islamic summit held in Doha on September 15. Although Qatar and the UAE vetoed the proposal, preventing it from becoming reality, the resulting instability could still pave the way for new Middle Eastern initiatives to emerge against Israel, potentially challenging both existing and future normalization agreements. Conversely, if Hamas refuses to give up its weapons, and as Trump has stated, Israel would have Washington’s backing, further aggravating Gaza’s humanitarian situation. Both scenarios would once again put pressure on Arab public opinion, with potentially major consequences for political legitimacy and economic stability across the region. Whatever path each actor decides to take, it will shape the ongoing future of stability in the Middle East.
Maxime Fritsch, associate researcher at the CERMAM
References :
[1] HASSAN Zaha. « Is the U.S.-Israel Gaza Peace Plan a Deal or a Distraction ? ». Carnegie Endowment, 3 october 2025 (https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/10/us-israel-gaza-peace-plan-deal-distraction?lang=en&utm_source=ctw&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=btnlink)
[2] GORDON Philip. « The Perilous Path to Sustained Peace in Gaza. A Conversation With Philip Gordon on the Pitfalls and Opportunities of Trump’s Cease-Fire Deal ». Foreign Affairs, 9 october 2025 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/perilous-path-sustained-peace-gaza)
[3] PLITSAS Alex, ABERCROMBIE-WINSTANLEY Gina, WARRICK Thomas S. « Israel and Hamas just struck a ‘phase one’ deal to return hostages. Is the end of the war near ? ». Atlantic Council, 8 october 2025 (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/israel-and-hamas-just-struck-a-phase-one-deal-to-return-hostages-is-the-end-of-the-war-near/)
[4] GORDON Philip. « The Perilous Path to Sustained Peace in Gaza. A Conversation With Philip Gordon on the Pitfalls and Opportunities of Trump’s Cease-Fire Deal », op.cit.
[5] HILTERMANN Joost R., HALL Natasha. « The Gaza Deal Is Not Too Big to Fail. How Israel’s Military Dominance Could Undermine America’s Quest for Regional Peace ». Foreign Affairs, 9 october 2025 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/gaza-deal-not-too-big-fail)
[6] ROSS Dennis. « How to End the War in Gaza for Good. American and Arab Pressure Can Ensure Israel and Hamas Reach a Durable Settlement ». Foreign Affairs, 10 october 2025 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/how-end-war-gaza-good)
[7] YACOUBIAN Mona, TODMAN Will. « What Comes Next for Israel-Hamas Ceasefire ? ». Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 9 october 2025 (https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-comes-next-israel-hamas-ceasefire)
